More than seven months have passed since the agreement was signed by Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and the leader of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), Mazloum Abdi, on the 10th of last March, and there is no indication of its implementation on the ground on the near horizon, despite the formation of joint committees to implement all the terms of the agreement, which stipulated “merging civil and military institutions in the northern and eastern region of Syria,” while guaranteeing the rights of the Kurds constitutionally, the return of the displaced, and the participation of all Syrians in the process. Transitional.
In addition to other provisions related to rejecting calls for partition, and handing over oil and gas fields and border crossings. In addition, the agreement itself specified its implementation period not to exceed the end of the current year.
Intensifying communications
The March 10 agreement strengthened the hope among many Syrians of the possibility of reaching national consensuses that would satisfy all powers, but its failure to implement it turned into a factor of frustration inside Syria, in addition to concern abroad, especially among Turkey, which is monitoring the situation in the areas of northeastern Syria, known as the Syrian Jazira.
It considers it a threat to its national security, given the control of the Democratic Union Party in Syria over the most important joints in those areas through its civilian (self-administration) and military outputs (the Kurdish People’s Protection Units, which constitute the main force in the “SDF”).
International concern and the consensus on the need to stabilize the situation in Syria called for the American party to take action. In order to advance the negotiations, American efforts have recently intensified to push for the implementation of the agreement, or at least to agree on practical steps to implement the merger gradually.
In this context, several contacts and meetings took place between officials in the Syrian government and delegations from the forces controlling the Syrian Jazira, the most important of which was the recent meeting held between President Ahmed Al-Sharaa and Mazloum Abdi, in the presence of the US Special Envoy Tom Barrack and the Commander of the US Central Command, Admiral Brad Cooper.
The intensification of communications indicates that the agreement of last March 10 is still viewed as the basic building block agreed upon in order to extend the sovereignty of the new Syrian state over all Syrian lands, and to reunify the country, thus ending the state of divisions that were imposed in previous years.
Some media reports said that the understandings resulting from the last meeting included the integration of SDF elements into the ranks of the Syrian army through the establishment of three divisions and several military brigades, distributed in the governorates of Al-Hasakah, Raqqa, and Deir ez-Zor, so that all of them became under the command of the Syrian Ministry of Defense.
The understandings also stipulated that the Internal Security Forces of the Autonomous Administration, known as the “Asayish,” would be integrated into the Syrian Ministry of Interior, and operate under the umbrella of its security services. This indicates that the merger, which is taking place gradually, and within an institutional framework, aims to extend administrative and military sovereignty in the areas controlled by the “SDF” and the Autonomous Administration, while maintaining local arrangements. In order to ensure stability there.
The understandings also included the Syrian government’s approval to grant the people of the region administrative positions within the new formations, in a way that contributes to embodying the local balance equation while preserving the state’s sovereignty and enhancing its stability.
Mazloum Abdi acknowledged in media statements that the recent meetings led to “verbal coordination” regarding the integration of “SDF” into the ranks of the Syrian army, and he spoke of the existence of an initial understanding on the “principle of decentralization” and the return of the displaced to their areas.
In addition to “a preliminary agreement to form joint military units to fight ISIS, based on the proposal of the American envoy.” He did not talk about gradual merger steps, but rather added that “the disagreement centers on the interpretation of terminology.”
The problem is that the “oral” understandings were not accompanied by any implementation steps on the ground, which gives an indication that implementation is still far away in the foreseeable future, and that the path to procrastination is still open.
Reasons for procrastination:
The American sponsorship of the recent meetings between representatives of the Syrian government and the SDF delegation does not differ from its sponsorship of previous similar meetings, as it did not leave the framework of sponsorship of the mediator, who stands at the same distance from the two parties. That is, the sponsorship is formal and does not require any executive guarantees, nor does it require any political commitment regarding the implementation of what emerges from it. Thus, the understandings and agreements that resulted did not find their way to gradual implementation, given the procrastination of the influential leaders in the regions of northeastern Syria. And its hesitation regarding the integration process.
There is no doubt that there are many reasons behind its procrastination in implementing the agreement, the most important of which are:
1- The leaders of the Kurdish Democratic Union Party in Syria, which dominates the Autonomous Administration and the SDF as well, view the merger process as an existential threat to them, and link it to the Kurdish issue and the rights of the Kurds, in order to cover their eagerness to preserve the narrow gains they achieved during the previous years at all levels.
2- The leadership of this party does not view the agreement as an opportunity to integrate into the Syrian body, as it is betting on the possibility of the areas under its control obtaining an independent entity, or at least obtaining autonomy, that would guarantee its continued control and hegemony over those areas rich in natural resources.
3- It uses procrastination as a vital strategy for it, while negotiating with the Syrian government is nothing more than a means to buy time, reduce Turkish pressure on it, and wait for local and international conditions to change.
4- This leadership seeks a formal merger, in which the SDF maintains its independent military command structure, and extends its control over the areas of its influence, which it wants to remain under the management of the Autonomous Administration agencies, and it has no objection to this being done under the banner of the Syrian government, as it relieves the pressures of the Turkish party on its shoulders, and at the same time reduces the popular tension against it in the areas under its control.
But this effort is not accepted by the new Syrian authority, and Ankara strongly rejects it.
Prospects and scenarios:
The meetings did not lead to taking concrete executive steps, and the March 10 agreement remained awaiting its implementation on the ground, including the ceasefire, as the past period witnessed many security violations, especially on the front line in the vicinity of the Tishreen Dam, and the villages and towns adjacent to it, in addition to clashes between the Syrian security forces and the Kurdish People’s Protection Units that control the Ashrafieh and Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhoods inside the city of Aleppo.
The survival of the Syrian Jazira regions outside the Syrian body represents the greatest challenge facing the new Syrian administration, and stands in the way of its endeavor to control the entire Syrian territory. However, it preferred the option of negotiation and resorting to dialogue for internal and external considerations, and in line with the desire of all Syrians to avoid engaging in new battles after the fall of Assad.
The numerous meetings and gatherings with delegations of the SDF and the Autonomous Administration did not succeed in establishing an effective framework for negotiation, or building common ground for dialogue with them.
The reality of the situation in Syria does not present many options for the Syrian government, the leaders of the SDF, and the Autonomous Administration, as dialogue is the safest way to reach gradual implementation steps for the March 10 agreement.
It will not be useful to buy more time by procrastinating, or even to follow a strategy of aggravating the situation on the ground by repeating frictions and clashes, using them as an excuse to seek support from the forces of the international community, and using the narrative of victimhood. In order to demand self-government and a federal system; Because excessive use of such methods may not lead to a winning scenario for the de facto forces controlling the regions of northeastern Syria, and put them in a historical impasse, from which it is difficult to get out. What is more beneficial is to seize this historic opportunity in order to participate in shaping the future of Syria after the Assad regime.
The influential forces in northeastern Syria and the Syrian government are aware of the strengths and weaknesses of each of them. The government is raising the card of the Syrian state’s rights and its endeavor to extend its sovereignty over the entire Syrian territory, in addition to international and regional support for this endeavor.
The most important thing is that the majority of the residents of northeastern Syria want to return to the embrace of the state, and believe in the unity of the Syrian body.
On the other hand, the dominant forces on the Syrian Jazira want to cling to their areas of control, and they invoke decentralization and the constitutional guarantee of the rights of the Kurds, which the Syrian government does not deny. It strives to preserve the apparatus of the Autonomous Administration and the military structure of the SDF forces, even if they merge with the Syrian army.
This does not give room for reaching compromise solutions, because the merger scenario requires the national interest to prevail, and not looking at the merger issue according to profit and loss calculations. Because it is a matter of joint construction of Syria’s future.
It is more beneficial for all Syrians to adhere to the principle of participatory governance and the right to equal citizenship, and to consider them as a constitutional right for all of them in all regions.
The opinions expressed in the article do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of Al Jazeera Network.