On February 4—three weeks before Russia invaded Ukraine—Vladimir Putin met with Xi Jinping in Beijing. The two leaders said in a joint statement that friendship between Russia and China “has no boundaries.”
Seven months later, Xi may regret those words. Speaking before a meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Council in Uzbekistan, Putin promised to answer all “questions and concerns” that China has regarding the war in Ukraine.
Neither Putin nor Xi have discussed these concerns publicly. But it’s not hard to guess about them. The war weakened Russia, destabilized Eurasia, and strengthened the Western alliance. None of this looks good when viewed from Beijing.
The February 4 statement made clear that at the heart of the Sino-Russian friendship is a shared dislike of American global leadership. A quick Russian victory in Ukraine—just months after America’s chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan—would be another major blow to U.S. prestige and power.
This would suit Beijing quite well; and might even pave the way for a Chinese attack on Taiwan. By contrast, the protracted conflict in Ukraine—and the prospect of Russian defeat—is a major strategic setback for China. As Nigel Gould-Davies of the International Institute for Strategic Studies says: “China has a lot of reasons to be unhappy.”
The most obvious is that Russia is China’s most important international partner. The two countries are not formal allies. But they support each other at international forums and conduct joint military exercises. Xi’s first foreign visit since taking office was a trip to Moscow. Xi called Putin his “best friend.” But now his friend looks like a loser. And China’s friendship with Russia looks more like a source of shame than an advantage.
In addition to weakening China’s most important international partner, the war in Ukraine has sparked a resurgence of the Western alliance. US leadership looks confident and effective again. American weapons helped turn the tide of the conflict. New countries are lining up to join the NATO alliance. Chinese state media love to highlight the West’s inexorable decline. But suddenly the Western alliance looks quite cheerful.
Beijing could at least take comfort in the fact that the “global South” turned out to be neutral, and sometimes even tacitly pro-Russian, in this conflict. This is important because competing for the allegiance of countries in Africa, Asia and South America is an important part of China’s rivalry with the United States.
But the mood in the global south is changing. At the Samarkand summit, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi publicly rebuked Putin, telling him that “today’s era is not a war era.” The Russian leader had to promise: “We will do everything we can to stop this as quickly as possible.” Last week at the UN General Assembly, India joined 100 other countries in voting to allow Vladimir Zelensky, the president of Ukraine, to deliver a virtual address. A total of six countries joined Russia in opposing the speech. China abstained.
Xi likes to emphasize his desire for stability. But the war provoked instability in Eurasia. Azerbaijan has just attacked Armenia, which is an ally of Russia. Fighting also broke out between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
A seriously weakened and confused Russia is a much less useful partner for China. And the results of the war are revealed gradually.
The absolute nightmare for Beijing would be the fall of Putin and his replacement by a pro-Western government, which is unlikely but not impossible.
Of course, a weakened Russia also brings some benefits to China. Moscow is now increasingly economically dependent on Beijing. Putin recently spoke darkly about the rigidity with which China conducts commercial negotiations.
Some Washington analysts go even further, arguing that a war in Ukraine will permanently force Moscow into Beijing’s fist while distracting the United States from its confrontation with China. They argue that America’s decision to enter into a pact with China in 1971 marked a turning point in the Cold War. Now, they fear, the opposite is happening – and the China-Russia axis is tightening.
But this argument views great powers as value-free pieces on a strategic chessboard. The reality is that Russia and China formed an informal alliance because their worldviews have much in common. It is unlikely that any of them will turn 180 degrees and decide to join America. America is the problem they are trying to solve.
The Russia-China partnership unveiled on February 4 was also largely a personal deal between two strong leaders. Putin and Xi clearly liked each other’s style and saw themselves as the embodiment of their respective nations. They were, in the words of Alexander Gabuev of the Carnegie Moscow Center, “a king and an emperor.”
But now that Putin looks more like Nicholas II than Peter the Great, Xi must regret ever having so wholeheartedly embraced his Russian counterpart.