The Israeli Jerusalem Post revealed the existence of an Israeli military unit, which it described as “mysterious”, and “Sabir” is called its job to transfer the intelligence of the Israeli army underground.
The newspaper pointed out in a report of the Israeli military correspondent Yona Jeremy Bob that this unit worked to help the army to evade Iranian attacks, while preserving its data centers and technology inside Gaza, Lebanon and Syria in the middle of the war.
He pointed out that the huge ballistic missile attacks that Iran launched against Israel last year failed to cause serious qualitative damage to the Israeli military, due to the distribution of parts of the military capabilities of the army.
The report said that the full range of spacing between military capabilities and the army’s fortification of its underground sites is still completely unknown, especially with regard to the army’s intelligence.
Ancient idea
In 2020, there were multiple reports about the trend of army intelligence to transfer many of its operations to underground installations, but a lesser unit in intelligence, Sabir, has become responsible since the Al -Aqsa Flood attack, to accelerate the transfer of military intelligence services to full -time underground facilities Or more underground emergency facilities available to them.
Indeed, by time Iran fired 120 ballistic missiles at Israel in April 2024, the majority of what should be underground had become underground and already restricted operation.
Sabir has a number of tasks in favor of the army’s intelligence, but one of the main components of its mission is to ensure the continued operations even in the worst crises.
Most of the places where the Israeli army intelligence moves is very confidential, and there are reports on some secret operations in unlimited parts in the north and south, and at the military headquarters in Tel Aviv.
Benefits of the Iranian attack
Israeli army sources said that the Iranian attack in April 2024 helped to clarify the operations that need to be strengthened or underground technological answers, as at the time of Iran’s attack in October 2024, most of these issues were addressed.
While most concrete examples are classified, the general example can be some unlimited technological platforms to maintain the flow of unit 9900 data properly. The number of army intelligence personnel was also classified, and the secret step affected thousands.
Sabir himself has many officers with the rank of colonel, most of them from the army’s intelligence, but a large minority came “on loan” from the Communications Command in the army. The number of its soldiers has almost doubled after the Al -Aqsa flood to maintain all the newly required actions.

The biggest challenge
In response to a question about whether the biggest challenge in this field is Iran, a control of the rank of colonel in the Sabir unit answered that the most difficult challenge is not only dealing with Iran, but with all opponents at the same time, “everything should happen very quickly.”
Israeli army sources said that the army intelligence should not work mainly above the ground in the long run if the army wants to ensure continued work.
They said that the entire Israeli army needs to move in a more secret direction, but in particular the intelligence of the Israeli army and the relevant vital infrastructure. The sources said that the intelligence image cannot be run from tents above the ground amid a collective catastrophe.
It is clear from this that Sabir is responsible for creating the technological infrastructure of Israeli intelligence, wherever it is. Large parts of the new army intelligence sites have been built from the beginning. Sources in the army said that the lessons learned from this war will only lead to enabling this trend and will not require significant architectural or conceptual reflection.
Enhancing encryption capabilities
There is another project from Sabir to enhance the encryption capabilities of records and software in the event of the worst scenario, starting from a rule that is seized, as happened in the Gaza border area in the Al -Aqsa Flood. There are advanced new technologies to address complex issues, which cannot be published.
Sabir received a huge amount of additional money to complete its mission. Sources in the army said that the Ministry of Finance is finally aware of the importance of preparing for the worst scenarios.
At the beginning of the current war, there may be some urgency to finance, but in the end everyone realized that the war needs mean cutting the routine so that the army could take more quickly action.
Budget
Jerusalem Post said the fighting on 7 fronts, with hundreds of missiles reaching not only of the so -called expected enemies but also from distant and unexpected threats such as the Houthis, led to a fundamental change in how to deal with the budget for possible threats in the future.
The report revealed that computers and artificial intelligence systems may have collected intelligence information during the war – as a theory about some Hamas leaders – and this needs to be transferred digitally to emails and phones for Israeli intelligence officers, so that they can analyze and summarize their effects and then transfer them to officers Field intelligence leaders.
He said that Sabir is dealing with such issues, and provides encryption services for all different lines of the army’s intelligence communications, and it also protects the new incoming files that may contain viruses.
Sabir faces cyber threats
The report stated that Sabir faces many cyber threats more than ever, and there is more information and tactics that are shared with the Israeli Internet Directorate. There were also improvements to defense against artificial intelligence -based breaches.
He added that one of the radical revolutions of Sabir took place during the current war when many of its members were forced to shift to work in the enemy’s lands in Gaza, Lebanon and Syria. The army sources said that they “never dreamed that they would need to establish a full computer network in the enemy’s lands.”
One of the officers in Sabir said that working in all these areas represents a much greater challenge in the West Bank, where the army and intelligence societies possess wide infrastructure, run by their unity.
In 2014, the head of the field intelligence did not enter Gaza with the leading forces. Instead, he operated and updated intelligence from a distance inside Israeli territory.
Immediate services
Now, the updated front intelligence systems in the battlefields can show a map updated 10 minutes ago. With this 10 -minute update, army leaders can decide to take a new or different road instead of using the road that appears on a folded and fried map that was difficult to read.
The report pointed out that the leaders of the front brigade usually have a plasma screen to show them the scene of the battle more clearly. The attack plans are digitally loaded, and army personnel can see changes in newly discovered sites and tunnels.
Sabir soldiers faced service hardships in the fighting lands for the first time. Many were not fully ready to deploy in the field by shooting around them while trying to place an antenna on a roof, but the sources of the army now say that the SABIR soldiers have developed more flexibility.
Less physical intelligence
There was also an evolution, as such roles were implemented by the most experienced leaders and soldiers, and only the least experienced soldiers were integrated into the field installation teams. By the time they had to establish networks in Lebanon in September 2024, the Sabir unit was more prepared to such special challenges than in Gaza in the fall of 2023.
Moreover, there were less physical intelligence in Lebanon, but the Israeli army forces managed to seize huge quantities of Hezbollah missiles. The Israeli army announced earlier that it had seized in Lebanon about 60,800 pieces, equipment and electronic documents.
However, the Israeli army did not go to Beirut, and this information did not reach some personal electronic devices of senior Hezbollah officials. Regardless, the Israeli army bombed in Beirut a much greater number of Hezbollah’s higher ranks.
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