“Blade the excuses” .. a trap to strangle the resistance policy

Throughout the history of the struggle against colonialism, the dominant forces sought to use multiple strategies to control the resistance and reduce its impact. These strategies were not limited to direct repression or military oppression, but rather to include more complex attempts aimed at awareness and the collective will of the militant peoples. Within this framework, the concept of “bridging the excuses” appears as a political tool that is intended to curb the resisting act; Under the pretext of maintaining stability or avoiding escalation.

In the Palestinian context, these policies take a special dimension due to the overlapping of political and social factors in light of a long -term colonial reality. The concept of “bridging the excuses” is manifested here as a mechanism for controlling the struggle action, as it turns from a way to protect society into an excuse to freeze any move that threatens the occupation.

While liberation movements in the world – such as South Africa and Algeria – have succeeded in breaking these strategies through a liberal discourse that reshapes awareness, the challenge in the Palestinian situation is still existing: how can the resistance control policies be overcome in all its forms, and to build a popular will that effectively challenge the occupation.

Bed the excuses in the colonial context

Although the term was not used literally in many post -colonial studies, the colonial authorities have often practiced the policy of “bridging the excuses” to prevent the emergence of resistance or national awareness, through a set of measures, such as preventing national education or teaching the language of the indigenous population: on the pretext that spreading the languages ​​of the indigenous population can be used to spread independent ideas, and such as controlling the press and publications, if it has to form a collective consciousness towards colonialism, Or by fighting cultural, religious or historical symbols of the indigenous people; Because it expresses the collective identity of colonial societies.

Post -colonial literature strongly criticizes this type of “preventive prevention” as a form of ideological control and control. Edward Said called for the promotion of personal and collective ability in the face of pre -prepared ideas by colonialism, and also what Franz Fanon referred to about the mechanisms of colonialism, which goes beyond physical control to reach control of consciousness, where the colonizer lines the concepts and dynamics of domination and reproduces them within his society, where the revolution and revolutionary action turns into an act that raises fear and confusion instead of being an expression of will Liberation.

“Bed the excuses” can also be seen in the experiences of liberation movements, as in the experience of South Africa, Algeria, and India. In South Africa, the apartheid regime used legal excuses to preserve the system and political repression against blacks.

In Algeria, French colonial practices used excuses such as “preserving order”; To justify the suppression of the National Liberation Front. In India, Britain used excuses similar to the depiction of resistance as “reactionary” forces.

In all of these movements, the breaking of the “bridal of the excuses” required building a coherent liberal discourse that opposes colonial narratives, and rebuilding liberal legitimacy on popular and international foundations.

Re -framing the “Bed” policy from a liberal perspective

The liberation movements in the world have no problematic in the idea of ​​”bridging the excuses”. In the experience of the African National Congress in South Africa, there was a tendency in some periods to calm the militant act; On the pretext of not giving an excuse to the racist system to intensify repression.

Likewise, in other experiences, but this was in the context of adopting a comprehensive struggle strategy based on integrating the diplomatic act with popular resistance and armed struggle, not to leave a vacuum that colonialism exploits to rearrange its agenda.

The main dilemma lies in combining “bridging the excuses” and the liberation work in the double use of this concept. On the one hand, the idea of ​​”bridging the excuses” is presented as a preventive measure aimed at preventing escalation, or provoking violent reactions by the occupier.

On the other hand, this concept can turn into a restricted tool that paralyzes the struggle movement, and transforms the liberation action into mere reactions governed by the conditions of the occupation.

When the policy of “bridging the excuses” is adopted absolutely and not flexible, it turns into a permanent restriction on the liberation action. Hence, the challenge in reformulating the concept comes to transform from being a mere procedure that is concerned with avoiding repressive reactions, into a conscious strategic tool concerned with the timing and location of the action and ensures the greatest impact of the lowest political or social cost.

The absolute use of the policy of “bridging the excuses” neutralizes the struggle action, and places it in the category of deferred action; Under the pretext of preserving stability or avoiding escalation, therefore, it is necessary to re -framing the concept to become part of a comprehensive struggle strategy. The anti -colonial revolutions were launched from a radical liberal will, and not from the logic of adapting to the terms of the colonizer.

The attempt to negotiate or identify with the logic of the colonial authority weakens the struggle of liberation, because the occupation adopts the concept of hegemony, and what the occupiers seeks is to break it. But the most difficult transformation is that the policy of “bridging the excuses” turns into ideology and a political program, which uses every fighter act and be free, whatever its type, and becomes a philosophy of repression, not a philosophy of control.

Palestinian excuses: barriers in the face of the popular revolution

The policy of “bridging the excuses” developed in the Palestinian context to exceed the mere calm and controlling the resisting act, or controlling the rhythm between the political and the militant, to become a comprehensive and comprehensive strategy and strategy that restricted the militant work in several directions, most notably the following:

• The first: the use of a “bridal” policy as a mechanism to restrict the mass and popular struggle act, under the pretexts of “maintaining security”, or “avoiding escalation”, and imposing forced restrictions on mass movements, from an analytical perspective, it can be said that the policy of “bridging the excuses” in the West Bank enhances a political climate that removes resistance of all kinds of its legitimacy on the one hand, while it is allowed for settlers to continue They extended them with full support from the occupation government.

This indicates that the occupation does not actually need excuses to expand its settlement, but rather is part of its long -term strategy to include and Judaize the land.

The occupation is always in the case of producing its own excuses to justify the genocide, as the policies of controlling the mass movement cannot stop a settlement project that feeds on the logic of genocide and replacement.

Consequently, the continued adherence to the policy of “bridging excuses” reflects an inaccurate reading of reality, and weakens the ability to mobilize effective popular resistance capable of facing settlement as an existential danger, and historical experiences have proven that popular uprisings were a pressure factor on the occupation to restrict its activities and not the other way around. Evidence that had it not been for the first intifada, there would be no “Palestinian national authority.”

• The second trend: refraining from taking measures that would restrict the occupation and limit its ability to exterminate. This concept has turned into an excuse for not following the possible ways to restrict the occupation and hold it accountable for its crimes, for fear of the occupation’s reaction.

For the years before October 20, 2023, the Palestinian leadership did not improve its political and legal tools, at a time when an urgent need to create an international crane to strengthen its position and restrict the occupation movement.

Although she possesses important and viable files such as the issue of the assassination of the martyr Yasser Arafat, or the repeated massacres committed by the Israeli occupation in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the authority did not initiate its seriousness on the international scene.

These files could have been a symbolic and legal turning points that bear the occupation responsibility, and establish a “moral and legal deterrent” that weakens the logic of impunity.

• The third trend: In addition to the reasons that comply with the negative position of the authority towards the arrangement of the Palestinian house and the rapprochement with Hamas, one of these reasons is to adopt the strategy of “blocking the pretexts” of the occupation, and the silence of the authority with fear of fear of the occupation’s reaction to the authority itself.
• The fourth trend: The “Blade Policy” also affected the construction of international alliances. Often, engaging in partnerships with liberation movements or countries supporting resistance is avoided for fear of “anger” western countries or exposure to political and economic pressure. This strategy led to relative isolation, especially in international forums, where the Palestinian issue is sometimes presented within a purely “humanitarian” speech that avoids highlighting the liberation dimension, which weakened alliances with the anti -colonial movements in the global south.

In conclusion, the “bridge” is not adopting the justifications for the discourse of the occupation in genocide, marginalizing the popular act, or silence on crimes, but rather by building a liberal political project, monotheistic policies, legal and diplomatic initiatives embarrassing the occupation and adopting it in front of the world.

But when these policies are absent, the vacuum that the authority leaves turns into an open arena in which the occupation moves without deterrence, and the authority – even implicit – becomes a party that facilitates the aggression, not someone who puts an end to it.