Positive adaptation or graduated openness? Damascus options in the face of normalization pressures policy

Between and rejecting normalization, there are many options available to the new Syrian administration in managing its relationship with Israel, in light of international political, economic and security pressures, in exchange for incentives and promises of regional and international openness.

Its research paper is eliminated Olive Center For the writer Atef Al -Jolani Entitled “Syrian options in managing the relationship with the Israeli entityThe Syrian options take place between 4 tracks, most of which are likely to adapt the positive, calculated, or open openness to Israel, with a warning against slipping to the normalization that the paper sees as a red line and a strategic danger to the future and role of Syria.

First: external pressures and incentives

The new Syrian leadership faces continuous pressure to influence its political and regional orientations. The West is subject to its political and economic openness to it, as it responds to the sensitive internal files (minorities, sects, women, and education) and its position on the relationship with Israel.

Therefore, Damascus was put in front of two options:

1. Either responding to Israeli, American and European requirements in exchange for legitimacy, support and openness.
2. Or rejecting pressure to threaten the stability of the system and recover the economy.

Israel practiced the policy of the stick and the island, so its military operations in the Syrian territories continued, claiming the protection of minorities, especially the Druze, while regional and international powers moved to provide tangible political and economic incentives.

Among the most prominent of these steps:

• Lifting US and European sanctions (May and June 2025), after Saudi and Turkish pressure on Washington.
• The Headquarters for the Liberation of Al -Sham removed the terrorist lists (July 2025), in preparation for the abolition of international sanctions against Syrian President Ahmed Al -Shara and other officials.
• Major economic agreements: Investing the port of Tartous with “Dubai Ports” worth $ 800 million, and 47 Syrian Saudi agreements signed a value of 6.4 billion dollars.
• A wide diplomatic openness represented in official visits from France, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Qatar, Egypt, Jordan and others.

Second: Cautious Syrian responses

Under the pressure of these developments, the Syrian leadership expressed cautious responses to open security channels with Israel.

• In May 2025, the UAE launched a back channel for the Syrian -Israeli dialogue on security issues.
• President Ahmed Al -Sharaa announced in Paris the existence of indirect negotiations through intermediaries.
• Later, Reuters revealed direct meetings between Syrian and Israeli officials, especially in the border areas, headed by the Syrian side, the commander of the endosperm security, Ahmed Al -Dalati.
• In July 2025, a high -level meeting was held in Paris between Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad Al -Shaibani and Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer under American auspices.
• In August, the Syrian News Agency (SANA) said that a meeting with Foreign Minister Asaad Al -Shaibani gathered with an Israeli delegation in the French capital, Paris.

It is noted that the Syrian -Israeli meetings have gradually moved from indirect communication through intermediaries to direct meetings between delegations representing the two parties, and they also moved from the state of secret to the public within a relatively short time, in an indication of a decline in the level of hesitation and the Syrian caution against declaring these meetings.

Third: Syrian options

The paper believes that Damascus stands in front of 4 main options:

1. Table heart: He refused to respond to pressure, adhere to the national principles and the nation’s principles, and harmony with the traditional Syrian position that rejects normalization.
2. Positive adaptation and calculated resistance: Activating power elements intelligently to overcome pressure without slipping to normalization.
3. Granded openness: Submit some security and political concessions to stabilize the new reality and get out of the crisis.
4. Wide normalization: Adopting Abraham’s agreements and engaging in a path that goes beyond the Palestinian issue.

Fourth: The factors affecting the Syrian options

The paper determines factors that encourage Damascus to open up, most notably:

• The need for international legitimacy and regional recognition.
• The desire for internal stability amid sectarian and ethnic threats.
• Facing Israeli threats to direct military intervention.
• Economic pressures and the need to lift sanctions.
• The effect of the Turkish position encouraging the Syrian administration on the flexibility.
• The influence of some Arab countries involved in the path of normalization and the Abraham agreements, which encourage the Syrian administration to follow its example.

On the other hand, there are strong obstacles to normalization:

• The intellectual heritage of the Sharia President and the Liberation of Al -Sham, with his Islamic background that rejects normalization.
• The strong Syrian popular rejection of rapprochement with Israel.
• The continued Israeli aggression in Syria, Lebanon and Gaza.
• The experiences of the Arab countries (Egypt and Jordan) that have not achieved benefits of normalization, but rather faced new threats.

Fifth: weighting

The paper concludes that the weighted option in front of Damascus is:

1. The second option: positive adaptation and calculated.
2. Or the third option: graduated openness.

While the chances of rejecting pressure are completely diminished (the first option), and in the short term is excluded to engage in wide normalization (the fourth option), because of its serious internal and popular risks.

Sixth: Recommendations

The paper recommends the Syrian leadership with the following:

• Adherence to the option of positive adaptation and activating the elements of strength without slipping into normalization, based on a wide popular base that rejects it.
• The realization that the response to the pressure will not end it, but rather will lead to more extortion.
• Attention to the fact that Western powers view the current system as a temporary stage, and seek to attach the stigma of normalization with it.
• Using the elements of the Syrian force, as happened in the events of As -Suwayda, where Damascus was able to impose its position despite the Israeli pressure.
• Activating the role of civil society and popular forces to enhance the hardness of the official position and reject normalization, in a way that provides the regime internal immunity in the face of international pressure.