Is it decided to decide the siege of the General Command, the Battle of Khartoum? | policy

Wars are pregnant with surprises, as it often does not end with what they want to ignite its fuel. In World War II, Hitler’s sweeping attack on the Soviet Union ended in the heart of Berlin, and the legions of the Soviet army reached the German capital after a bloody fight for years.

The German attack led to a counter -attack, and the rudder turned, and Moscow, which is threatened with the German invasion, dominated the entire eastern Europe, all the way to East Germany itself, for about half a century, until the Berlin Wall collapsed and then disintegrated the Soviet Union in 1991.

From Europe to Africa, and if the geography and the numbers of the fighting and their identities differ, the content is similar. After nearly two years of the outbreak of fighting in Sudan, the Sudanese army announced its regaining control of the Jelly oil refinery located about 70 km north of Khartoum, and its control of the military manufacturing area north of the city nautical.

He also announced the arrival of his forces to the signal weapon in the middle of a sea, and the siege of the headquarters of the General Command of the Armed Forces, to continue the momentum of its counter -attack, which included controlling the control of Sennar State, southeast of Sudan, then the city of Madani, the capital of the state of Al -Jazeera in the center of the country, all the way to strategic places in Khartoum, The door opens for the grand prize of regaining control of the entire capital again.

These field developments reflect the change of the direction of the war, which had previously appeared to be tending towards the rapid support forces that took control of most of the western Sudan and parts of the center to the southeast of the country, and at that time fears escalated that Sudan is about to be a complete chaos similar to what happened in Somalia in the nineties of the twentieth century From the collapse of the state, as the country has turned into feudalism that the warlords are fighting, and the tribes compete in controlling the country’s capabilities and resources.

The indicators of this were broken by the widespread destruction that affected the capital, which included the airport and the headquarters of ministries, banks, hospitals and schools, amid complete paralysis of the aspects of life, the internal displacement movement and to neighboring countries that affected about a quarter of the Sudanese people.

The Rapid Support Forces did not provide an attractive ruling model, and looting, looting, kidnapping and killing spread in the vast areas they controlled, which earned them a widespread aversion among all citizens, while fears of the transition of war and chaos prevailed to neighboring countries, which means the influence of Libya, Egypt, Ethiopia and Eritrea as well About the broader ocean in the Red Sea, the African century, the southern desert and North Africa.

From stretching to decline

As long as time passed, the rapid support elements appeared advanced weapons that were not previously widespread in Sudan, and they did not appear at the beginning of the fighting, such as anti -tank guided missiles, drones equipped with missiles, suicide marches, and heavy heavy armored vehicles, as well as anti -aircraft systems.

Rapid support in obtaining these advanced weapons relied on support from regional parties through the use of Umm Jars Airport in Chad, which sparked disputes at the Chadian interior. The Chadian ruling elite belongs to the Zaghawa tribe, whose children are fighting against rapid support in Darfur on the Sudanese Chadian border.

The conversation spread in the reports of the United Nations and the major newspapers such as the New York Times on the weapons and ammunition transported through Chad to rapid support, so attempts began to open an additional supply line across the Ethiopian border, so rapid support launched at the end of 2024 attacks towards the state of Al -Jazeera and from there in the middle of 2024 to the state of Sennar that It is located on the borders of Ethiopia.

Despite the success of the army in the expulsion of the Rapid Support Forces from Sennar and the city of Madani, the capital of Al -Jazeera, the rapid support remnants extended to new areas, taking advantage of the vast areas in Sudan to reach areas in the states of the White Nile and the Blue Nile bordering the states of South Sudan and Ethiopia.

These developments were reflected in Khartoum’s relations with Juba, with the spread of accusations of the participation of fighters from South Sudan with the Rapid Support Forces in the state of the island and other places, attacks against a number of citizens of South Sudan occurred after the restoration of a civil city, which caused anger in southern Sudan, and they rushed Right masses to attack the shops and homes of Sudanese citizens residing in the capital, Juba, in January, amid calls from the Sudanese army and the government of South Sudan for citizens to calm down and avoid being drawn into attacks on the basis of ethnic or ethnic identity.

These events added a new crisis in South Sudan, which is severely affected by the closure of the oil transport pipeline for export from its lands through the Sudan ports due to the war. In the past, the Commander of the Rapid Support Forces, Hamidati, accused members of Al -Taghary in Ethiopia of fighting with the Sudanese army, which shows some regional dimensions of what is happening in Sudan, their repercussions on countries and their connections to other struggles that take place within those countries.

Restore the rudder

Several regional and international parties tried to push the Sudanese army leadership and rapid support to sit to negotiate, and Washington cursed a conference to negotiate in the Swiss city of Geneva in August 2024, but the army refused to attend, the field reality was not in its favor, and negotiation at the time means devoting the field gains obtained by rapid support Politically.

The headlines have emerged to negotiate that included the treatment of the fighting parties in a manner characterized by a club, and the lack of recognition of the army as a representative of legitimacy, but as a party in a rivalry with another party represented by rapid support, and in return the army insisted that it represents the legitimacy of the state in the face of a rebel group.

The army’s failure to attend the Geneva negotiations did not pass without a price. The US Treasury Commander, Abdel -Fattah Al -Burhan, added to the sanctions lists in January 2025 after adding the days before him the commander of the Rapid Support Forces Hamidati to the same list, to pressure them and push them to sit together.

Washington is disturbed by the entry of competing parties on the conflict line, such as Moscow, which modified its compass towards the Sudanese army after the previous Wagner Company supported the Rapid Support Forces, up to Russia’s veto use against a British Security Council resolution in the UN Security Council, which was considered by the Sudanese army leadership to affect the country’s security and put the army with Fast support on an equal footing, as well as American apprehension towards Russia’s request from the Sudanese leadership to obtain a naval base in Port Sudan, which will allow it to be in the Red Sea, in addition to the return of Sudanese -Iranian relations after its interruption since 2016, and the provision of Tehran to the Sudanese army with a number of drones .

In exchange for negotiating calls, specifically at the end of the rainy season in 2024, the Sudanese army launched by September 2024 a wide counter attack with the participation of the elements of the Operations Authority of the General Intelligence Service, the Mustafin Brigades and the joint force that includes most of the formerly rebellious Darfurie groups. The army succeeded in crossing many strategic bridges on the Nile to break the equation of the Rapid Support Forces control over the western Nile areas.

At the beginning of his attack, he succeeded in lifting the siege on his camp in Al -Kadro in the Bahri area, then his field achievements continued, up to his success in breaking the siege on the armored vehicle in the military tree area, which paved the way for him to expand in the Jabra neighborhood and seize the house of Hamidati, the commander of rapid support, to the dismantling of The siege on the headquarters of the General Command of the Armed Forces in the heart of Khartoum.

The aforementioned attack seeks to restore the capital, allowing the army to strengthen its legitimacy with achievements on the ground, and hope to resolve the battle militarily, or at least improve the army’s position and sit down later to negotiate a powerful homeland.

The Sudanese army succeeded in restricting the Rapid Support Forces in Khartoum, as it was repeatedly bombed by the aircraft arms shipments on the main road for the supplies of the Rapid Support Forces, coming from Chad and then Darfur to Omdurman and from there to the capital via the Treasury Bridge of Jabal Awlia south of Khartoum. Consequently, the Rapid Support Forces began to suffer to provide supplies and fortify their defensive lines in the face of the army.

Rapid support reaction

In response to its field retreat, the Rapid Support Forces resorted to using the burned land policy, and the jelly refinery facilities were destroyed before its withdrawal from it, and a tactic used to attack the power plants in the army control areas using swarms from drones, so the converts of Ghazala station were destroyed, which sinks of the strategic city of Meroe in the state The northern in the dark, then it was repeated by attacking the transformational Al -Shawk power power plant transformers, which led to the power outages in Gedaref, Kasla, Sennar, east and southeast of Sudan.

The Rapid Support Forces also attempted to resolve the battle of control over the entire Darfur region, and they mobilized its fighters to attack the city of El -Fasher, the capital of the state of North Davor, the last fortress of the army in the region. Rapid support announced in January 2025 a 48 -hour deadline to evacuate Al -Fasher before it was invaded, and indeed the city attacked 5 axes in a simultaneous time, but the army aircraft bombed the attacks attack In it.

In Khartoum, the Rapid Support Forces are trying to gather their ranks, and to form new defensive lines that stop the army crawl. The city of Khartoum differs from other flat battlefields, where there are high buildings and close and adjacent residential blocks, which gives rapid support elements a defensive position that is compatible with their combat capabilities, which suit the war of cities, the most prominent of which is their skills in using light and medium firearms, and their possession of sniping weapons and mobile weapons Anti -armor, and their ability to move in the use of tattasher vehicles, as well as using citizens ’homes to hide, store ammunition and prepare ambushes.

On the other hand, the army relies in the battle of Khartoum on intelligence, running aviation and private work units as well as fighters of the General Intelligence Service, as it is the most experienced party in the city war in Sudan. These components determine the rapid support, leadership and control headquarters, weapons stores, supply lines and places of snipers to target them with air strikes and ambushes as an introduction to advanced to control the targeted areas, and to link the besieged army headquarters inside Khartoum with the advanced forces from the multiple fighting axes, especially from the state of the island.

Turkish mediation

Several Western and regional parties have submitted mediation attempts to no avail, but recently, specifically on December 13, 2024, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan called the Sudanese Sovereign Council Chairman and army commander Abdel Fattah Al -Burhan, and offered him mediation between the Sudanese army and the UAE, the most prominent ally of the forces Rapid support, and after the telephone calls, Burhanuddin Duran, Turkish Deputy Foreign Minister, met with proof in Port Sudan, and the proof announced his welcome to Turkish mediation, but later stated that a future for rapid support in Sudan.

The proof publicly did not refuse Turkish mediation, but it does not seem to be betting on it in order not to hinder the field progress achieved by the army or give an opportunity to quickly support its breath and collect the diaspora of its forces or receive qualitative weapons that change the course of the battle, as well The army is that it represents legitimacy, as well as its political and economic importance, while the Sudanese street is witnessing spontaneous mass celebrations and wide popular support for the armed forces, which is not seen in the areas of rapid support control, but rather witnesses the constant frictions between its fighters and the masses of citizens.

The indications of the restoration of a civil city have already been addressed, and it paves the way for the battle of Khartoum, which is what is currently happening, so the option to negotiate will increase its chances of success after regaining control of Khartoum, but at that time it will not be on the ground of the conflict between two identical entities, sharing power or restructuring the army Fitting the demands of rapid support, but will be on the ground of negotiation between the powers of a country that controls the capital and most of the states of the country in exchange for a rebel entity that controls parts of the Darfur region, and the transfer of the main effort to fight to Darfur may lead to more pressure on rapid support, and he accepts its leaders. On the terms of the army.

And with the crystallization of the new features of the map of the conflict in Khartoum, it is likely that the possibility of the collapse of the state is declining, and that Sudan has passed the danger of Somallah, so that matters would return to the situation that Sudan lived on for decades with the presence of rebellions in its limbs, which is a situation that undoubtedly remains, as it has already resulted in the secession of the south Sudan in 2011.

But the difference now is that rapid support is not popular in the Darfur region, where there are profound differences within the region between tribal components of Arab and African descent, which is reflected in the fighting between the joint force represented by Darfurian movements and rapid support, as there are differences even within the Arab and incubating components Social support for rapid support, as the famous leader Musa Hilal, the leader of the Mahamid tribe, supports the Sudanese army in the face of rapid support, although he gathered with a kinship link, and the latter had previously worked under the leadership of Hilal before his star emerged, and therefore the option of separation, as happened in the south, has little chances.

In conclusion, the new American administration led by Trump is not concerned with the continuity of wars such as those that occur in Sudan, and it may pressure from it to some external bodies supporting rapid support, while there are other regional bodies disturbing from the continuation of the conflict, foremost of which is Egypt, as well as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia . Washington and other capitals in the region can limit the interventions that blow the fire in the differences inside Sudan, and provide supplies that allow rapid support to continue the fighting and fight battles that lost their political goals that took place with the imagination of his leaders at the start of the war in mid -April 2023, so their control over the rule became closer to the aspirations and dreams than them .